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DIRECTORATE OF  
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NORTH VIETNAM: An upswing in military recruitment and conscription appears to be under way.

Since around mid-March, the North Vietnamese press has been filled with articles of the kind noted during past induction drives. Accounts have described large numbers of youths--more than 10,000 from Haiphong and a handful of rural provinces alone--"enthusiastically volunteering" for service.

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Not all the fresh inductees into the regular army are raw recruits; some evidently are to be upgraded from the local self-defense and militia forces. An item in the party daily newspaper on 15 April said that all young militiamen from three villages near Hanoi and many from the Haiphong area have signed up. This upgrading process long has been an important source of relatively experienced military personnel for the army.


The current drive may have been designed in part to make up the losses incurred by the Communists in eastern Laos and Cambodia this dry season. To some extent it may also reflect the increasing efforts the North Vietnamese have had to make over the years to fulfill their military manpower needs, although there is no evidence that manpower shortages have been a constraint on Hanoi's war strategy.

It seems likely, in fact, that one reason Hanoi is recruiting more troops now is that it anticipates an increase in the Communist war effort some time in the future. The recent articles indicate fairly clearly that many of those now coming into the army

are earmarked for duty outside North Vietnam. Because of the normal training requirements and the condition of the infiltration trails during the coming rainy season, the presence of most of the new troops is unlikely to be felt in Indochina before the second half of this year at the earliest.

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PAKISTAN-INDIA: The two governments appear to be trying to defuse the diplomatic crisis that arose over the recent closing of their respective Deputy High Commission offices in Dacca and Calcutta.

Indian Deputy High Commissioner Sen Gupta, who had been put under virtual house arrest by the military authorities in Dacca, is now allowed to come and go at will. Islamabad has also indicated its willingness to arrange for the repatriation of Indian diplomats and their dependents from Dacca to New Delhi via Nepal at the same time that those Pakistanis who want to leave Calcutta are repatriated. Plans to use Soviet planes to fly the Indians out of Dacca are being discussed with Pakistani authorities.

The Pakistanis, according to an official of the Indian Foreign Ministry, will be allowed to interview the members of their mission in Calcutta who have defected to "Bangla Desh." The Pakistani Government had insisted on this to be certain that none of the mission members had been coerced. Pakistani officials, in turn, deny that they will insist on the forced repatriation of "genuine defectors."

Top officials of both governments presumably are sensitive to the dangers involved in prolonging the diplomatic crisis--particularly when tensions are high as a result of shooting incidents along the Indian - East Pakistani border. Local functionaries, however, have tended to take a more emotional attitude and may yet try to obstruct the evacuation procedures.

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PERU - COMMUNIST CHINA: Great fanfare in Lima has accompanied the signing of a trade agreement and the Chinese endorsement of Peru's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea.

In a ceremony at the Peruvian Foreign Ministry on 28 April, Foreign Minister Mercado announced the mutual extension of most-favored-nation treatment and hailed as an historic landmark Communist China's formal announcement of support for Peru's position on territorial waters. Mercado said that a Peruvian mission would go to Peking soon to work out specific trade procedures. He also used the occasion to announce that talks on establishing commercial relations with North Korea and East Germany were under way.

The Peruvian Government has been very active in seeking support for its claim to a 200-mile territorial sea. Communist Chinese propaganda has applauded the "anti-imperialist" stand of the Latin American countries that have adopted the 200-mile limit. There are indications that the formal inclusion of this support in the agreement might prompt Peruvian officials to review their over-all policy toward China, although Mercado had earlier assured the US ambassador that no changes were imminent.

Following the ceremony, Mercado told reporters that the UN must become a "universal organization." The same day, President Velasco told reporters that the possibility of diplomatic relations with Peking was being studied.

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HAITI: President Duvalier offered conditional amnesty to Haitian exiles in his first policy address to the National Assembly on 29 April.

An amnesty had been rumored, but the offer was not expected so soon. The apparent daring of the invitation is tempered, however, by the condition that neither Communists nor "troublemakers" will ever be allowed to return. The amnesty offer should separate the men who left Haiti for serious political reasons from those who went in simple search of better jobs and personal liberty. It may serve to unite the various exiles who are excluded by the amnesty's terms, although the depth of their differences would seem to preclude any real mobilization of opposition.

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Cambronne and General Claude Raymond, chief of staff of the armed forces, are the young President's chief advisers, taking precedence over his sister Marie-Denise Dominique, who is serving as the President's private secretary.

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GUYANA: Increasing labor troubles and efforts of the political opposition to capitalize on them are troubling the Burnham government.

The most pressing problem at the moment is the 11-day-old wildcat strike at the Demerara Bauxite Company (DEMBA); there have now been several instances of violence and no signs of settlement. An additional problem for the government may result from the separate action of civil service organizations in threatening the government with a "deadline" to meet their two-year-old wage demands. Opposition leader Cheddi Jagan, predictably taking advantage of the situation, has met with both labor groups and called a not very successful one-day strike of sugar workers in sympathy with the DEMBA strikers.

The black militant African Society for Cultural Relations with an Independent Africa (ASCRIA), in a marked departure from its usual go-it-alone policy, is working with other militant groups on issues ostensibly unrelated to the labor unrest. Among these is the youth arm of Jagan's People's Progressive Party, toward which ASCRIA has been consistently hostile in the past.

In the view of the US Embassy, consultation and public cooperation by ASCRIA and the civil servants with Jagan thus far are intended only to pressure the government and do not appreciably further Jagan's political ambitions. The DEMBA strike has damaged the economy and Jagan may manage to create further labor woes for the government, however.

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CEYLON: Only scattered action has been reported recently, and the major insurgent attacks anticipated at midweek did not occur. Despite the increasing weakness of the insurgents' position, however, few of them are likely to accept Prime Minister Bandaranaike's terms for surrender during a truce set by the government from 1-4 May. The official proposal is couched in generally unsympathetic terms, and the government perhaps has made too much of its orders to the security forces to treat the rebels well, thereby indirectly confirming stories concerning previous brutality by the army and police. Although Mrs. Bandaranaike warned that she will order a major offensive if the rebels do not surrender during the truce period, the security forces do not appear capable at present of mounting an effective sustained drive.

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USSR-SYRIA: Damascus recently received 12 MI-8 helicopters from the USSR, the first since 1968.

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Moscow may well have agreed to provide equipment for a modest expansion and modernization of the Syrian armed forces along traditional lines. When armed with rocket pods, the aircraft is suitable for small-scale, commando-type operations, as well as for general transport use. Over the past year the USSR has supplied large numbers of MI-8 helicopters to Egypt.

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GUINEA - USSR - COMMUNIST CHINA: President Toure is pressing for increased military assistance from both Moscow and Peking because of his concern over internal security and what he regards as a continuing threat of foreign-backed armed attacks on his one-party regime. A Guinean delegation empowered to sign new agreements has recently been in Moscow, Guinea's primary military supplier, and a Soviet delegation to Conakry is expected soon. A Chinese mission also is to visit Conakry later this month at Toure's request. Past military aid from the Chinese has been negligible, but Peking's willingness to discuss the question now is in keeping with its other recent moves to increase Chinese influence in West Africa.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: The regime has announced price cuts on a wide range of consumer goods, ostensibly to boost retail trade and stimulate lagging demand. The reductions, which range between 10 and 15 percent, are for such items as ready-made clothing, radios, television sets, and refrigerators. Only one food item, canned meats, is on the list. The price cuts, billed as "evidence" of the regime's success in stabilizing the economy since the reform era, are clearly designed to help the regime prior to the coming party congress. Rude Pravo's denial that the cuts were "aimed at currying favor with our citizens" will only strengthen popular belief that the move is a palliative. The action also reflects the regime's nervousness about possible embarrassing disruptions at the time of the congress.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 30 April 1971 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 36.5-71 "Libya"

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